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Abstract. Testing is an important part of tackling the COVID-19 pandemic. Availability of testing
is a bottleneck due to constrained resources and effective prioritization of individuals is necessary.
Here, we discuss the impact of different prioritization policies on COVID-19 patient discovery and
the ability of governments and health organizations to use the results for effective decision making.
We suggest a framework for testing that balances maximal discovery of positive individuals with the
need for population-based surveillance aimed at understanding disease spread and characteristics. This
framework draws from similar approaches to prioritization in the domain of cyber-security based on
ranking individuals using a risk score and then reserving a portion of the capacity for random sampling.
This approach is an application of Multi-Armed-Bandits maximizing exploration/exploitation of the
underlying distribution. We find that individuals can be ranked for effective testing using a few simple
features, and that ranking them using such models we can capture 65% (CI: 64.7%-68.3%) of the
positive individuals using less than 20% of the testing capacity or 92.1% (CI: 91.1%-93.2%) of positives
individuals using 70% of the capacity, allowing reserving a significant portion of the tests for population
studies. Our approach allows experts and decision makers to tailor the resulting policies as needed
allowing transparency into the ranking policy and the ability to understand the disease spread in the
population and react quickly and in an informed manner.
Keywords: Sampling · COVID-19 · Multi-Armed Bandit · Monitoring.
1 Introduction
The SARS-CoV-2 virus causing COVID-19 has spread globally and was declared as a pandemic by the World
Health Organization. Testing for COVID-19 has been an important tool in both monitoring the spread of
the virus as well as in the attempts of preventing its rapid spread. Quickly identifying outbreaks is a key
to combating the spread of the disease [2,19]. However testing is bounded by the available resources such
as number of available tests, reagent bottlenecks, laboratory accreditation and technical constrains. Since
the number of tests is limited, governments and decision makers around the world apply policies guiding
who should be tested. During the outbreak countries implemented different testing policies. These policies
vary in a wide range of approaches such as: testing of symptomatic individuals only, testing of symptomatic
individuals and their contacts, test only hospitalized patients [19,8], test severe cases [15], test with a rigid
policy for optimizing to the most likely phenotypes [20], or testing with a policy and two random groups as
done in Iceland [7]. In the case of unlimited test capacity a policy of testing everyone was applied in Wuhan
(Wuhan May-2020, 11M tests) [24,12].
Testing serves multiple purposes. The first is to identify sick individuals in order to treat them correctly
and safely. The second purpose is to stop the disease from spreading by contact tracing of positive individuals,
this is critical for lowering the reproduction number of the disease. Finally, early identification of disease
activity and case clusters allows governments to respond by increasing contact tracing, testing, and shelter
in place or social distancing.
Most countries implement risk driven policies [20] and result in data which is biased towards the patients
that conform to the policy, as others, such as asymptomatic carries [find cite], will not get tested. This
bias causes two major problems. Firstly, decision makers do not have the information necessary to make
decision about the virus spread (or lack accurate information). Lack of information prevent governments
from properly assessing risks in the first stages of a new pandemic when virus characteristics, such as the
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death rate, were unknown and estimated based on biased information [23]. Secondly, time to identify new
disease clusters is prolonged, since most testing resources are spent on the existing clusters as symptomatic
cases are prioritized (”searching under the lamppost”).
In recommendation systems, this is a well known phenomenon, named ”filter bubble”, in which the users
of the system are trapped in a subspace of options thereby losing the ability to explore beyond what they
already know [17,1].
Monitoring a population with a limited capacity for testing individuals is not unique for epidemiology, a
similar challenge exist in the realm of cyber-security where users are monitored for signs of compromise such
as malware installation or data theft by employees. Database Activity Monitoring systems log and test user
actions to identify compromised users and identify their actions. The purpose of data security is similar to
the task of testing and contact tracing organizations. The sheer amount of daily user activity in IT database
systems prevents testing and logging every action, instead these systems use an approach of ranking actions
by risk using a policy and logging only potentially risky activity. This approach suffered from the same filter
bubble problem of data biased towards the policy, and inability to quickly react to new threats or changes
in activity.
In this paper we present a framework for data driven testing policy that optimizes both test utilization (i.e.
maximizing detection of new cases) while investing resources in exploration that allows gathering unbiased
surveillance information about the population and quickly identifying new disease clusters. This framework
borrows from a similar approach based on Multi Armed Bandits (MAB) for balancing exploration and
exploitation when monitoring database users.
To be adopted, approaches that enhance policies created by experts have to maintain the experts in the
loop. The models must be explainable, no ’black box’ decision can be made, especially with clinical outcomes
and public health effects of such a system. The model also needs to be adjustable and the experts need a
measure of control for tuning it, allow the experts to make decisions balancing different risks, and enable the
experts to add features (such as adding geographic, clinical or population demographics features).
The system we propose allows the experts to make decisions that drive the ranking model, add features
on the fly if needed and balance exploration/exploitation as needed. Using a data set of COVID-19 patient
symptoms released by the Israeli Ministry of Health we find that it’s possible to rank patients effectively
for optimizing recall of testing, correlating to the exploitation mechanism of MAB. Using 10% the testing
capacity is enough in order to identify 66.6% of the positive individuals (CI: 64.7%-68.3%), and at 70% of the
capacity 92.1% (CI: 91.1%-93.2%) are identified. This enables diverting testing capacity towards exploration
without harming recall and present a novel framework for COVID-19 testing policy. We trained two models
on different time frames and find significant difference in their efficacy, suggesting policy changes affect
what’s learned from the data which provides another strong incentive for using a major part of the testing
capacity for exploration such as random sampling.
2 Background
To maximize the detected infected individuals [11] suggest a screening approach that is made of combining
three complementary testing strategies: (1) test all individuals with typical COVID-19 symptoms (2) deploy
targeted testing based on the population density (to maximize the likelihood of infections) (3) reserve a small
number of tests for random population screening to monitor the testing policy. They suggest combining it
with campaign and funding for isolation of infected individuals. Iceland testing policy was also made of
both : targeted testings of individuals at high risk and population screening [7]. Initially they invested in
testing all individuals who desired to get tested, mostly from the capital metropolis. To provide a control
testing group they randomly selected individuals who where summoned to be tested representing the age
and gender demographics.[20] modeled the probability of individuals to test positive to SARS-CoV-2 based
on their response to a daily symptoms survey. They did not suggest or evaluate the effect of using their
predictive model for ranking.
Both policies lack the motive of dynamic updating of the policy. The first [11] paper does suggest an
estimation of infection prevalence however it can be viewed as special case of our suggested model where
population density or epicenter is of high priority in the risk score model. The second [7] work has both
exploration and exploitation motives however the policy of who should be tested is static and there is no
element of learning from one time frame to the following. We suggest a testing framework that enables
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maintaining and constantly updating the testing policy in a principled manner while keeping the experts
and decision makers in the loop. This framework also enables introducing new features to the model.
The Icelandic research [7] also shows that targeted testing improves the tests’ recall. 13.3% of the targeted
tests resulted positive versus only 0.8% from the ”open invitation” population, and only 0.6% recall for the
randomly selected ”control group”, which is compatible both with [20] and our results that shows a ”risk
score” can be learned and improve the test recalls.
2.1 Assigning a Risk Score
Many domains, such as health, insurance and bank loans use a risk score as a common practice for prioritizing.
[13,16]. The risk score is not a policy, but can be used as part of the policy for decision making [21], e.g.
newborns with low Apgar score will stay an extra day at the hospital[10]. Risk score can be assigned based
on predefined list of rules and conditions. The science community has been extensively working on using
machine learning models for risk scoring in many domains [18,6,4] For an ML risk score to be accepted by
the medical community it is important that it allows experts to tweak it (add clinical features, local biases)
and is explainable [14]. Clalit Health Services (CHS) created a risk-scoring tool to predict the severity of
COVID-19. [3]. NHS England defined risk factors to predict death from COVID-19 [22]. We suggest using a
risk score to prioritize COVID-19 testing as part of a ranking system.
2.2 Monitoring as a Sampling Problem
Monitoring database activity is based on collecting the data into log files feeding these files to the anomaly
detection system. The anomaly detection system uses the data collected to detect anomalies. Database
activity is characterized by a vast amount of traffic flow. Since data storage is expensive and limited, the
high volumes make it impossible to process and log all of the traffic flows resulting with examining only a
sample of the data. as a common solution, such systems use manually defined policies made of rules and
activity groups to decide which transactions to save.
The fact that the policy is manually defined by the company’s security expert leads to monitoring that is
skewed to the expert’s risk scoring method. If exists a risk that the expert is unaware of, this risk might be
detected late during the attack, when the cost is high and it is harder to control the damage done . Taking
a risk driven monitoring approach restricts the security expert’s ability to discover concept drifts,such as
changes in users’ roles, and may cause the “filter bubble” phenomenon, in which the expert is examining only
a subspace of events that are over-fitting to the known risks, thereby losing the ability to explore beyond
what they already know [17,1].
More over because the process of defining the monitoring policy is hard and time consuming, policies
have a static nature : once defined, they are rarely changed.
Grushka et al. [5] suggested taking a dynamic approach by adding diversity into the monitoring policy
to add the ability of exploration for new risks characteristics and demographics. They showed the need to
balance exploration of activities and users of low risk with exploitation of high risk scored users and activities.
If we put too much emphasis on exploration, we are scouring the space well, but at the cost of scattering
and possibly late identification or even missing important events of high risk nature.
3 Bandit Framework for Epidemic Control
We suggest a testing framework in which by the end of each predefined time-frame (it could be day or maybe
a week) we reexamine our model and adjust it to the new detected demographics and risks in a principled
manner, keeping the experts in the loop, and providing them the data needed to discover and explore for
new infected demographics and features. We will address a scenario in which the time-frame is defined to be
one day.
This framework is made of daily calibration and training of the risk scoring model. The model is using
the risk score to prioritize the potential cases. The majority of the testing budget is invested in the cases
with risk score above a thresh-hold, the remainder of the budget is used for collecting new data where there
is a lack of data or data that has aged. This exploration motive could be used for exploring geographic
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location, demographics, or exploration of symptoms that are currently not used in the model. For example,
if the doctors are reporting of a symptom that is unknown or not in the model, the experts could set it as an
arm that could be pooled using a Thompson sampling. The exploration portion of the tests can also be used
as an intervention method. For example, testing all the residents and staff of a nursing home once a case is
discovered. The experts’ knowledge may be used for building the primary risk score model and introducing
new possible features to the model or new arms that should be pooled.
Fig. 1: MAB Testing Framework workflow : Each time frame (day/week) the population is tested. A
portion of the tests goes to the most likely infected individuals (exploitation) and the rest for exploration
(random sampling, or any other expert defined population). The initial risk score can be manually defined
based on the epidemiologists knowledge and supported by the data collected by the health organizations. At
the end of each time frame we incorporate the test results and their features, combined with the new results
obtained in the field and use this data to retrain the risk-scoring model (this can be limited to the randomly
sampled population to avoid the filter bubble). This framework allows the experts and decision makers to
create an explainable and agile policy in a data driven fashion.
4 Methods
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed framework we explore data released by the Israeli Ministry
of Health (IMOH) in order to show that effective ranking can be achieved using a simple classifier trained
on previous data.
To evaluate the effect of training on data gathered using different testing policies we train another model
on data from later weeks (beginning of the second wave of COVID-19 infections) and test both models on a
later test set.
4.1 Data
To evaluate our proposed thesis we use the Israeli Ministry of Health ”tested individuals” COVID-19 data
set [9]. This data set contains the result of all primary COVID-19 tests by dates collected over 10 weeks
from March-11th,2020 until May-10th, 2020 and contains over 300,000 records . Each record represents a
test for COVID-19 and is made of the fields: date, partial list of symptoms, including fever, cough, headache,
shortness of breath and sore throat, indication for the test, gender and the result of the test (positive negative
other). Individuals with a positive test result will appear only once in the data set, at the date of the first
positive result. The indication for the test is a descriptive feature that indicates the reason for taking the
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test in the first place. This field values are clustered into three categories: (i) contact with confirmed known
positive individual (ii) return from abroad and (iii) other.
This data contains all test preformed including random testing, and testing medical stuff at hospitals.
our data exploration showed that contact with a positive patient, cough, fever are the strongest features and
respectively has the highest correlation with positive test result.
4.2 Study Design and Population
Overall, the data contains 300,456 tested individuals partial symptoms and test results collected between
March-11th, 2020 until May-10th, 2020. the data contains null values mainly in the symptoms features, a
feature value is set to null if that data wasn’t collected. we compared discarding records with null values
to referring to null values as if there is no indication for this symptom and decided to take the second
approach. From the data analysis, we learn that most of the relevant data lie between weeks eleven to
sixteen. afterwards, the results show that there is a decrease in the rate of positive results
(a) Test results weekly distribution (b) Positive results weekly distribution
Fig. 2: Weekly test results distribution
4.3 Features Correlation to Positive Test Result
To gain insight into the features that contribute most to the predicted probability of being diagnosed with
COVID-19, we analyzed feature contribution using Pearson’s correlation. Table 1 shows that the features
with the highest positive correlation are: contact with confirmed individual, head ache fever.
4.4 Ranking Candidates
Due to the restricted amount of available tests not all individuals can be tested each day. therefore govern-
ments and decision makers needs to set up a policy to define Who should we test first. we propose taking
the conventional approach from the Cyber security domain of ranking the testing candidates and testing the
top X ranked individuals. we compare the following policies for ranking candidates for testing in terms of
recall and precision at preforming 1000, 2000,3000, 4000 or 5000 tests per week (up to about a tenth of the
actual tests performed):
– Rule Based our results show that contact with a positive patient, cough, fever are the strongest features
therefore we define a rule based baseline: score them with weights of 2,1,1 respectively
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Feature Median correlation to positive result
Contact with confirmed 0.587
head ache 0.292
fever 0.129
cough 0.124
sore throat 0.094
shortness of breath 0.084
Abroad -0.002
female (gender) -0.015
Other -0.433
Table 1: Features correlation to Positive test result
– Linear support vector machine (SVM) ranking based on the probability of the linear svm classifier
to classify the individual as positive.
– Polynomial SVM ranking based on the probability of the Polynomial svm classifier to classify the
individual as positive. Polynomial of 2 degrees– we assume that it could learn from the relation between
two features without over-fitting
4.5 Calculating Confidence Interval
Confidence interval was calculated using bootstrapping: the population was re-sampled for each week and
the recall was calculated for 10 such populations. The confidence interval was calculated using the Student’s
t distribution as the critical value.
4.6 Balancing Exploitation (Recall) / Exploration
We assume that decision makers will not adopt a sampling policy with low recall, as this leaves many patients
not diagnosed. In order to find a good balance between exploration and exploitation we examine the recall
gained by using 30/40/50/60/70 percent out of the weekly capacity as the sample sizes.
4.7 Effect of Retraining the Model on a Different Dataset
The testing policies affect the resulting data used to train the ranking classifier. We quantified this effect by
training two Polynomial-SVM models on different time frames of the data (weeks 10-12 vs weeks 21-23) and
evaluated both on a later time frame (weeks 24-26).
5 Results
The data exploration clearly shows that the pandemic was active during weeks 11 to 16
5.1 Predictive Phenotypes
We analysed the data to gain better understanding of the strongest predictive phenotypes. The results of
the Pearson correlation reflects the testing policy. From the results we can see that the best predictors for
positive test results are : contact with infected individual, fever and cough.
5.2 Ranking Patients Using ML
We compare the models in terms of precision, recall and F1 score. Table 2 presents the average weekly
recalls based on the the ranking model trained during weeks 10 to 12. We find 2 that using only ∼ 10% of
the testing budget we have a recall of 66.6% (CI: 64.7%-68.3%) of all positive result of each week. The recall
of the polynomial SVM at 70% of the testing capacity was 92.1% (CI: 91.1%-93.2%). In terms of F1-score
the polynomial SVM out-preforms the linear and rule based models (see Table 4).
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Fig. 3: Pearson correlation for each phenotype positive test result by test week
week recall @1000 recall @2000 recall @3000 recall @4000 recall @5000 number of tests
13 0.231 0.429 0.623 0.667 0.732 47310
14 0.267 0.502 0.618 0.689 0.696 34340
15 0.369 0.565 0.585 0.596 0.609 48087
16 0.509 0.590 0.608 0.613 0.622 53065
Table 2: weekly recall polinamial svm ranking model
5.3 Effect of Retraining the Model on a Different Dataset
We trained a second polynomial SVM models on weeks 21-23, the period of time where infections started
rising again in the dataset. We evaluated both models, 1st wave model and 2nd wave model, on the data of
weeks 24-26. We find that the 2nd wave model behaves differently. Recalls at lower capacities were better
with the second model and with higher capacities the first model achieved better results (see Figure 4).
Fig. 4: Recall of models trained on different subsets of the data when ranking the patients in weeks 24-26
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model recall @1000 recall @2000 recall @3000 recall @4000 recall @5000
svm-poly kernel 0.344 0.521 0.609 0.657 0.666
svm - confidence interval (0.31, 0.379) (0.503, 0.542) (0.602, 0.614) (0.639, 0.675) (0.647, 0.683)
linear SVM 0.317 0.517 0.606 0.619 0.623
rule-based 0.269 0.412 0.522 0.629 0.692
Table 3: Average recall by model
model F @1000 F @2000 F @3000 F @4000 F @5000
svm-poly kernel 0.455 0.536 0.522 0.483 0.425
linear SVM 0.415 0.530 0.520 0.453 0.395
Table 4: Average F1 score by model
6 Discussion
In this study we suggest a principled data driven MAB framework for maintaining tests policy for the COVID-
19 pandemic. Our framework is based on two components, ranking component for maximizing detection and
exploration component for maximizing knowledge of the disease in the population. This approach allows the
experts to make the high level decision on the policy while preserving the data discovery for re-evaluation.
Exploration can be random or based on more complicated sampling schemes such as based on geographic
features maximizing information for multiple objectives (based Thompson sampling) to overcome the filter
bubble phenomena. Testing policies used by governments can be seen as private cases of this framework:
testing only hospitalized patients is choosing maximize detection (100% exploitation, 0% exploration) while
the policy in Iceland which used two exploration strategies is on the other hand (allocating 10-50% of the
capacity for exploration and basing the exploitation on a manual ranking model). In both of these cases
using a data driven ranking model would improve recall (percent of positive tests).
We showed that ranking is feasible using a simple predictive model for predicting positive test results.
This corroborates similar finding by [20]. Using the data released by the Israel Health Ministry we found
ranking could have recall of 66.6% (CI: 64.7%-68.3%) on average using only 10% of the tests capacity and
92.1% (CI: 91.1%-93.2%) using 70% of the tests capacity. A simple rule based model based on the correlations
achieved similar accuracy, suggesting that drawing an easy to explain model is possible (at the cost of a very
little efficiency). Basing a policy solely on a ranking model would be very efficient capacity wise but would
lock the decision makers in a filter bubble. This approach is based on solutions to similar problems where test
capacity is limited in the realm of security [5]. Saving a major part of the testing capacity for exploration
allows both informed decision making and updating the ranking model daily or weekly to maximize the
efficiency.
Training a second model using the same architecture on data collected in weeks 21-23 and testing both
models on weeks 24-26 we found significant difference in model recall. This is not a surprising results as it is
expected that different testing policies would bias the distribution of individuals identified. However, these
results show that dedicating a significant portion of the testing capacity to random sampling would provide
a clearer picture to decision makers. Furthermore, training such a model once is not good enough, and a
framework to support retraining the model and choosing the best ranking model based on data is necessary.
In our example, if dedicating 30% of the testing capacity to exploration it is advisable to use the first wave
model, if exploration is raised to 60% the second model would achieve better recall (see Figure 4).
Future work should focus on simulating data using an Agent Based Modeling (ABM) approach and
testing different exploration policies under different conditions such as few cases in the population vs. many
or geographic sampling vs completely random exploration. We hope to see this framework replace ad-hoc
approaches to exploration and testing policy.
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